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Control questions

1. What are concept, judgment and inference?

2. Is absolute truth possible?

3. List contemporary theories of truth.

4. What is scientific truth?

5. Explain the difference between absolute and relative truth.

6. What is coherence theory of truth?

7. Explain Tarski's theory of truth.

8. What different approaches to truth under the general heading of deflationism can you mention?