Theme 7. Science and society: implications and issues of modern science
Strand, Roger & Kaiser, Matthias (2015). Report on Ethical Issues Raised by Emerging Sciences and Technologies. Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities, University of Bergen, Norway.
1. Introduction
Modern science was born in Europe in the 16th and 17th Century. The vast potential of knowledge and technology to change the human condition was anticipated from its early days. Francis Bacon famously stated: “Human
knowledge and human power come to the same thing, for where the cause is not known, the effect cannot be produced”. In the vision of Bacon, his contemporaries and his successors, Science held the key to a new world in which the wild forces of Nature were domesticated and humanity prospered; a world of “generosity and enlightenment, dignity and splendour, piety and public spirit”. The Utopian hope for science and technology was reiterated and reinforced during the Enlightenment, promising a society of welfare, equality, justice and happiness.
In the latter half of the 19th Century and throughout the 20th Century, modern science and technology came to fulfil many of the old visions and hopes. Human understanding and technological command over Nature have reached a level unthinkable for our predecessors. Health and medicine; food and nutrition; production and supply of energy; housing and transportation - these are but some examples of sectors and functions in our societies that have been repeatedly transformed as science and technology developed ever faster during the 20th Century. At present, early in the 21st Century, new scientific disciplines and research fields are emerging, such as nanoscience and nanotechnology, neuroscience and cognitive science, systems biology and synthetic biology. Other fields have a longer history but appear to have entered a stage of rapid and qualitative progress, such as robotics and information and communication technologies.
Finally, there are immense research efforts undertaken to combine and converge the insights from the various sciences into the so-called converging sciences and technologies. History justifies us to expect innumerous benefits for humankind resulting from these efforts and developments.In the 20th Century, however, History also taught humankind that with the great powers of modern science and technology comes great responsibility. The lessons were several: the need to develop international governance to cope with the challenges of nuclear power; the impacts of modern societies and their technologies on the natural environment and the climate; and the implications of biomedicine and biotechnology for human reproduction, health, identity and dignity. What Mary Shelley anticipated already in 1818 in her novel Frankenstein, or the Modern Prometheus was gradually understood and accepted in the second half of the 20th Century: That also the passion for knowledge needs to be tempered by ethical sense and rational assessment and management of its consequences.
The loci of ethical and rational temperance are and ought to be many. States have an undeniable responsibility for the safety and security of their citizens. Scientific actors and institutions are subject to national regulations and guidelines, as well as having strong traditions of selfgovernance on the basis of their own professional ethos. Finally and ultimately, individual human beings are also their own moral subjects with their own liberties and responsibilities as individuals and citizens for their individual and collective quality of life. Many of the ethical and political aspects of the risks and benefits of modern science and technology will rightfully be seen as concerns of individual choice, market mechanisms, institutional governance and national politics.
Still, however, there are scientific and technological developments of such vast dimensions and implications that international coordination and action is called for.
While the agency of the individual is essential in the unfolding of her or his life, it is Society's responsibility to secure the conditions for individual agency to be possible. Accordingly, modern societies have not only sustained a two century long discussion of the benefits and hazards of the technological developments. Visibly risky technologies - e.g. for warfare and destruction - have a long history of governmental regulation. The regulation of the ethical, legal and societal aspects of more indirectly hazardous technologies has sometimes been more demanding. It has taken a greater intellectual effort to interpret the developments, identify and understand the issues at stake and develop adequate societal responses. Modern biotechnologies provide a case in point. While the benefits they offer are many, the issues at stake have been seen to run deep into the very core of what constitutes humanity and the identity of the human species. Consequently, nation states and leading international organizations have all developed their legal and/or ethical frameworks to cope with the challenges posed by modern biotechnology. In this sense, this report marks nothing new in principle. Its objective is not to change how science and technology is understood by modern societies - as a provider of benefits and hazards; as a strong piece in the game but also a game changer - but merely to direct the ethical attention to new fields of science and technology, fields that are marked by rapid development that so far have not been much subject to ethical scrutiny.In short, conditions fundamental to the human condition may be at stake as science and technology advance. Hence, the Council of Europe expressed by the Convention on Human Rights and Biomedicine (the Oviedo Convention) its commitment to:
[...] protect the dignity and identity of all human beings and guarantee everyone, without discrimination, respect for their integrity and other rights and fundamental freedoms with regard to the application of biology and medicine.
(Article 1)Soon 20 years will have passed since the achievement of the Oviedo Convention. Science has made tremendous developments during these two decades. As noted above, new fields of research have come into existence. Other sciences merge with biomedicine. In society, the line between the medical domain and the non-medical (work, leisure, commerce and government) is being blurred. It is our claim that the ethical challenges posed by these developments to some extent differ and exceed those of the early days of human biotechnology, genetic engineering and cell biology. As shown by the Rathenau Institute in their report From Bio to NBIC convergence - From Medical Practice to Daily Life, the range of ethical issues is increasing and so is the range of domains where they apply. Below, we argue that fundamental rights and freedoms may be threatened in new ways that call for new measures of protection. The Rathenau report essentially claims that the issue at stake in the development of new and emerging technologies is the identity of the human species and human life itself, including the possible blurring and convergence between machines and living organisms, including humans. It proposes that contemporary societies become aware and prepared to ask which human traits we wish to pass on to future generations.
No single institution have, or could take, the responsibility for questions of this magnitude. Reflection, discussion and action are all needed at a number of levels: the individual, the family, the community, the market, our societies - and clearly the sectors of science and technology themselves. The Council of Europe and its Committee on Bioethics may play, and already plays, a proactive role at several levels. First, it is a forum for continuous reflection and discussion that contributes to anchor the answers to the new ethical issues in shared European values. In this way it may make an important contribution to meet the dire need for a deep understanding of the rapid developments, an understanding that may lead to identify needs for action also at a national or sectorial level as well as shared criteria for such action.
As a champion of the European heritage of democracy, the Council of Europe may through its activities in the bioethical field contribute significantly to the creation and development of proper political attention to the emerging ethical issues among governments, in citizenries and in the governance of science and technology.Moreover, the centrality of the Oviedo Convention in later governance and practice of science and technology has shown that the Council of Europe is in a key position to approach the need for international governance and legal developments. Being philosophers of science and ethicists, we do not possess the expertise required to analyse possible legal measures that could be taken, such as a revision of the Oviedo Convention or the preparation of a new convention. We shall, however, state the needs for new measures as they follow from our analysis of the ethical challenges, and humbly suggest some ideas for action for the DH-BIO to consider.
2. Ethical Issues Raised by Emerging Sciences and Technologies - What is at Stake?
Emerging Sciences and Technologies - Realities and Imaginaries
This report is one on ethical issues. As there is a plurality of ideas on what ethics is and how it should be practised, we begin by clarifying our own methodology. First, we have considered our task as one of identifying and clarifying ethical issues rather than passing verdicts on specific technologies or decision problems. This report will not “apply” substantive ethical principles - e.g. consequentialist or deontological principles and analyses - to condemn or acquit certain technologies or their use. Instead, our approach is grounded in a discourse ethics position. Our task is to show what may be at stake in various issues from various angles, notably from a human rights perspective that will encompass both typically utilitarian concerns of risks, hazards and benefits, and concerns more akin to those of duty and virtue, in technological developments that appear to destabilize fundamental categories of human dignity and identity.
In this sense the report may be charged with eclecticism. Our justification for this choice, however, is rooted in a reflection upon our role and the role of the DH-BIO. We provide an overview and our judgments on what are the important issues. It is the role and competence of the DH-BIO to decide how to move forward with these issues of novel science and technology, to make its contribution to the responsible governance of research and innovation.We would also like to stress that this report deliberately focuses on ethical concerns. The emerging sciences and technologies are likely to provide numerous benefits to mankind and our natural environment. Responsible governance that deals thoroughly and proactively with potential hazards and other ethical concerns, is the best strategy in order to promote the positive developments to be expected. The function of this report is to scrutinize the field and bring the potentially problematic development to the fore. This methodological emphasis should not in any way be interpreted as a judgement on the future of the emerging sciences and technologies as a whole.
Research and innovation represent two sectors of society that are particularly difficult to govern. There are two reasons for this. First, competent governance of the societal implications of science and technology may require knowledge and understanding of the content of the same science and technology. As the research forefront moves with accelerating pace, such knowledge and understanding may be difficult to obtain. Secondly, these sectors are by their definition creators of novelty, surprise and unpredictability. A famous jazz musician, when asked by a journalist, is supposed to have responded “If I knew the jazz of the future, I’d play it”8. This paradox is equally applicable to science, research and innovation. In the regulation and governance of technology a variant of this paradox was called the “Collingridge dilemma”: The implementation of technology
into society is a complex, open-ended and unpredictable process, and risks and side-effects cannot always be anticipated. When the risks and side-effects finally are known, they are known because they are being experienced; and by that time they may be virtually irreversible due to their magnitude or their entrenchment into societal infrastructures or human culture. The private car is an excellent example of the Collingridge dilemma.
This means that governance of science and technology is bound to be outdated and too late if it merely responds to concrete realities in the form of well-established technological applications existing in use and in the market. Political and regulatory action have to include an element of anticipation, acting upon what does not yet exist but what is thought to be the science and technology of the future. Indeed, due to the rapid pace of development, there is not only a time lag in political and regulatory action, but already also in the interpretation and understanding of the development. Sometimes, new things are made faster than they are understood: Making, however sophisticated, may be a limited task of design and assembly, while understanding requires knowledge of the myriads of interactions between the new thing and numerous other elements in nature and culture.
The science and technology of the future is an even more peculiar object to take into account in governance. It is not material as such (while of course preliminary research results or technology pilots may be material). Rather, its mode of existence is that of individual and collective mental constructs for which there is an important element of imagination. Indeed, scholars of the interdisciplinary research field of Science and Technology Studies have convincingly argued that research policy as well as research practice are heavily dependent upon sociotechnical imaginaries, that is, narratives that imagine present and future society, present and future science and technology, and how they interact. The bioeconomy; the transformation of chemical industry by nanotechnology; the automation of the health sectors by personal autonomous robots; an ICT future with “a computer on every desktop” - these are all forceful examples of sociotechnical imaginaries that have had major impact on European research policies during the latter decades. Some of these imaginaries die away, others change, and others are translated into action that shapes concrete material reality. What is crucially important for an improved governance of science and technology is to understand that sociotechnical imaginaries are both real and important and not dismiss them as “science fiction”. Sociotechnical imaginaries are a constitutive part of any understanding of science and technology from which one may make ethical, political and regulatory judgments. We cannot emphasize too strongly that imaginaries implicitly play a direct role both in ethical action and R&I action, and for that reason they should be reflected upon.
From the point of view of governance of science and technology there are therefore two important approaches to sociotechnical imaginaries.
First, their existence should be treated as an empirical matter of fact. The Thomas Theorem of social science and psychology states that “what men perceive as real, is real in its consequences”. The Thomas Theorem applies to sociotechnical imaginaries: They have real influence on research practice and policy. For instance, the history of technology is ample with examples of interesting technological possibilities that failed to be championed by convincing imaginaries or experienced a setback so that public, political and scientific trust in the imaginary could not be recovered for a long time. The Zeppeliners are one such example; Tesla's lightning power stations another. The reality of imaginaries means, however, that they can be an object of governance. Whereas the practices of developing, formulating and promoting sociotechnical imaginaries so far have been dominated by scientists, innovators and investors, they need not necessarily be so. Many European governments, the USA as well as the European Union have accordingly devoted ever more effort into so-called upstream public engagement with the objective of expanding the participation and democratizing the processes of agenda-setting for research and innovation. Such efforts have become increasingly institutionalised. For instance, the 8th framework programme for research and innovation in the European Union (“Horizon 2020”) includes the concept of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI) as a cross-cutting principle in order to make R&I more responsive to social needs and goals.
As often is the case, however, it is not only the object of governance of science and technology that is complex. The current developments of governance itself are rightly described as complex, and sometimes described as governance in complexity rather than of complexity. The strengthened position of efforts grounded in ethics, such as RRI, upstream public engagement and the 574
democratization of agenda-setting for research and innovation, has taken place in parallel with an increased instrumental focus in the same countries whereby research policies are also focusing more on innovation, economic growth and job creation. This should be seen as a consequence of the financial crisis that hit European countries in later years.
At times, these complexities may take the shape of an apparent competition between the “softer” concerns about ethics and the “harder” economic concerns and interests. This tension has also been accompanied at times by a distinction between “softer” forms of governance, encouraging actors to take ethics into account, and “hard” governance in forms of binding law and regulations. What we see observe in later years, however, is the opportunity to overcome the distinction between soft and hard governance. One general development that has been noted in several countries is that ethics has become more law-like and law more involved in ethics. For instance, EU's “Responsible Research and Innovation” is both a set of practices for the various societal actors to take part in and develop, and in effect a legal principle passed by the European Parliament. Likewise, the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics includes principles such as those of solidarity and cooperation. The Council of Europe, as a champion of the European heritage of democracy and human rights, have an important role to play in these developments.
At the same time, there is still a legitimate and important domain more proper to “hard” governance, concerning regulations of use, prohibition and permission, monitoring schemes for risk and harm, et cetera. The second approach to the sociotechnical imaginaries is to treat them as early signals and early warnings, that is, to be used in foresight exercises as predictive information of the actual science and technology of the future. As such, this is inherently uncertain and unreliable information and there is no mature research-based knowledge for how to best interpret and manage it. Whether such knowledge may be developed, is also uncertain - it is essentially a question of the degree of inherent creativity and unpredictability of various fields of science and technology. Still, this does not preclude the possibility of governance, even hard governance. Early warnings based on imaginaries may very well warrant monitoring schemes that may be voluntary or required by law. They may also be taken as worst case scenarios that in themselves may warrant legislation and regulation, such as with human cloning (prohibition) or xenotransplantation (comprehensive safety schemes). In our opinion, this latter approach also clearly falls within the domain proper of the Council of Europe, as shown by previous accomplishments.
Our discussion builds directly on the report From Bio to NBIC Convergence, written by the Rathenau Institute for the DH-BIO, as well as the field of research into the ethical, legal and societal aspects (ELSA) upon which the Rathenau report builds. A key point in that report as well as in the literature in general is the trend towards convergence between the bio, nano, neuro and ICT fields, together with mechatronics and robotics. This convergence in its turn causes entanglement of the ethical issues that has been considered typical for each of these scientific and technological fields. A main point in the work of the Rathenau Institute is their emphasis on two so-called mega-trends: That machines become more similar to organisms, and that organisms (including humans) become more similar and more coupled to machines. The Rathenau report raises the question if this implies a need for new ontological and ethical categories if we are to understand and govern well.
We are sympathetic to this claim and believe it deserves thorough attention in ongoing reflection, discussion and debate. Still, we have adopted a different methodology in what follows, which may be described as a more incremental approach, trying to describe and interpret the emerging challenges in light of existing categories of ethical issues. In this way we have tried to identify issues that seem to be well managed by existing ethical frameworks as well as and issues that call for an extension of the frameworks. The disadvantage of our approach is that we may lose some complexity from sight. The advantage is that our conclusions may be easier to implement in practice. This methodological choice should be part of the discussion that will follow the report.
Specifically, we have found it useful to organise our discussion into seeing three sets of scientific and technological developments as paradigmatic cases, labelled as neuro, nano and ICT, respectively. Each of them will be analysed in terms of what we have found the most pertinent concern - that of priority challenges to human rights. In the final part of the report, we will return to these challenges.
Following these three main topics, we will briefly discuss three cross-cutting aspects that are equally relevant for the various S&T fields. The three are (1) the blurring of the line between the medical and the non-medical domain, (2) the ethical issue of global divides and equitable access and finally (3) the particular ethical challenges of military use of technologies...
4. Recommendations
... Recommendation 1. This report has identified a number of developments within emerging sciences and technologies that pose serious ethical issues and concerns, on the individual, collective and even international level. The Council of Europe has an important role in being a forum for continuous reflection and discussion needed to root the answers to the new ethical issues in shared European values and shared criteria for action. The Council of Europe is uniquely placed to take a leading role in this work, being not only a champion of human fundamental rights and values in the European tradition but also by its wide geographical coverage. The scope of the bioethical work of the Council should be permanently expanded to cover the developments in nano-, neuro-, info- and cognoscience and technology.
As explained above as well in the Rathenau report, an important characteristic of the current scientific and technological development is the increased interaction and convergence of the various fields. We do not consider it useful to e.g. establish separate ethics committees for, say, biomedicine on one hand and nanotechnology or cognitive science on the other. Rather, it seems a better solution to expand the scope and strengthen the resources of the existing work on bioethics. One option would be to expand the mandate of the existing committee on bioethics to a committee on the ethics of science and technology (in a similar vein to the COMEST committee of UNESCO). Furthermore, as explained above, the distinction between the medical and the non-medical is becoming less clear and less relevant in many issues. We accordingly recommend that the scope of ethical work is expanded beyond a medical/non-medical boundary. This does not imply that there no longer is a need for specific guidelines or principles within the medical domain. They are necessary; but they are not sufficient. In order to cover the needs for ethical work outside the domain of medical research and practice, however, both novelty and creativity in institutional practices are being called for.
Recommendation 2. Better governance is needed to increase the ethical and social robustness of new and emerging sciences and technologies. Such robustness can only be achieved if those affected by the scientific and technological developments are included in the processes of governance. However, all of society are affected because of the pervasiveness of modern science and technology. In line with the European heritage of democracy, a significant task for bioethical work is to accordingly play a proactive part in the democratization of the governance of science and technology and thereby our common scientific and technological future. This includes to develop and encourage participatory foresight exercises, upstream engagement and other practices of what has been called “responsible research and innovation” (RRI). As has been repeatedly noted by the EU and also the academic literature on the subject, improved governance should not be seen as opposed to progress and the right to freedom of research. On the contrary, lack of communication and mutual trust between science and society will ultimately lead to a breakdown of public support in research and innovation that few will see as conducive to progress and that may imply a much greater threat to the freedom of research and the autonomy of scientific institutions.
The DH-BIO is already to some degree taking part in the production of sociotechnical imaginaries role through its activities. The work should be strengthened. The Council of Europe may and should perform its own activities for exploratory and exemplary purposes. Another important role, however, is that of encouraging states to take their national and international responsibility for a democratic and responsible governance of science and technology in this regard. The Council could contribute also by shaping criteria, collecting best practices and providing advice and recommendations for states. We believe there can be strong synergies between such initiatives from the Council of Europe and similar efforts in the European Union and its so-called Associated States taking part in the European Research Area. The Council may strengthen, intensify and enrich this work by seeking active collaboration also in ongoing activities within the EU and the ERA, for instance connected to RRI and EU's Science-with-and-for-Society programme. The Council may also 576
wish to employ the recent Rome Declaration on RRI26 as a point of departure, together with the valuable ideas on public participation transmitted in UNECE's Aarhus Convention. A main added value provided by the Council is its focus (and expertise) on human rights as well as its geographical scope. Resources should be made available to facilitate such work.
Recommendation 3. In our report, we have observed threats to several fundamental rights and freedoms laid down by the Oviedo Convention as well as the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. A number of possible ways forward can be imagined also in terms of legal approaches and instruments, including new Recommendations on specific technological fields. For instance, one could consider to recommend mandatory ethics review of research fields that involve important ethical issues that fall beyond or outside of biomedicine and bioethics.
We would like to propose, however, that the Council of Europe also considers the possibility of establishing a new convention for ethics of science and technology in general, beyond the bioethical domain in a strict sense and with a wider scope of ethical issues. We have indicated the main fundamental rights and freedoms that we believe to be at stake in chapter 3. They include identity, integrity and dignity, right to private life and freedom of thought. It will be an important task to see how they can be secured as new and emerging technologies rapidly are created and introduced into society and human life. However, we have also argued that the new and emerging technologies in addition to their obvious benefits also raise concerns over safety, equitable access and justice. We have observed that the UNESCO Declaration on Bioethics of 2005 includes aspects such as those of equality, justice and equity; solidarity and cooperation; social responsibility and health; benefit sharing; and the protection of future generations and our natural environment. We would propose that such aspects are considered in a future convention for ethics of science and technology.
Recommendation 4. It is important to discuss how measures can be taken when the normative basis and the legal instruments are present, but new practices in the world of science and technology are seen to systematically violate them. For instance, the report has raised the question if not the new phenomenon of mass data collection and surveillance as a business model indeed is a violation of fundamental rights and freedoms of citizens. Still, there seems to be no political, legal or other governmental institution present in our societies that has the mandate or power to take firm measures on this basis. Simple measures of prohibition would clearly not work; they would typically infringe a number of other legal rights in democratic societies with (relatively) free markets. We think it is important to recognize the complexity of this challenge and the need new instruments and institutions of governance as well as institutional change. The Council of Europe could play an important role in this truly supranational challenge of institutional innovation, for instance by employing its experience and expertise to explore the possibilities for improved judicial defence of human rights in this area.
Recommendation 5. Several technological fields call for continuous monitoring with respect to the ethical issues they pose. This includes human enhancement, persuasive and personality-altering technologies and other technologies that interfere with the preconditions for enjoying fundamental rights and freedoms. The Council of Europe is encouraged to take a proactive role in the development and harmonization of such ethical monitoring schemes and practices.
There is no unique definition of “monitoring”. The importance of this challenge in part lies in the fact that it is so difficult. There are unresolved conceptual and epistemological challenges in how to identify early ethical warnings about research and innovation pathways. The state of academic knowledge with respect to these challenges has advanced the latter years but there is no general, simple, ready-made solution to implement and it seems unlikely that there will be such a solution. Still, the Council of Europe would do well in its further efforts to consult the work by the European Environmental Agency on “Late Lessons from Early Warnings”28 as well as the academically grounded policy literature on anticipatory governance of emerging technologies29. Examples of novel ethical monitoring methodologies have been provided by various EU-funded research projects, based respectively on mapping of public values; of public “hot topics” and sociotechnical imaginaries; and on interdisciplinary technology assessment methods30. This methods may 577
complement the more conventional approach of ongoing or periodic assessment of the state of technological development with respect to already defined ethical issues - checking for red flags, as it were.
In sum, a variety of conceptual frameworks exist or are being developed. They may require institutional innovation and change, however, in order to be fully implemented. Some forms of monitoring can be performed by standing or ad hoc ethics committees; others necessitate other institutional arrangements, of the RRI type. An important dimension of the institutional challenge is to ensure sufficient mandate and power of these institutions so that they may take the right measures. An ordinary ethics committee might be “too weak”; a risk regulation may depend on the existence of quantitative and robust risk estimates; legislation based on the precautionary principle may be ruled inferior to principles of proportionality; et cetera. In sum, the challenges may be too big for academic researchers, sectorial public authorities or even individual national governments. This calls for international collaboration and co-production of knowledge, understanding, practices and institutions, and we believe that the Council of Europe and the DH-BIO may play an important role”.
Roger Strand - professor at the Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities, University of Bergen, Norway.
Carl Walter Matthias Kaiser - Head of Department, Director, Centre for the Study of the Sciences and the Humanities, University of Bergen, Norway.
Control questions
1. How are science, tchnology and ethics related?
2. What is scientific ethics?
3. What problems arise from a mismatch between resources and opportunities?
4. Impact of science and technology on human lives.
5. What challenges of modern science do you know?
6. How do science and technology impact on humans' lives?
ESSAY TOPICS
1. The practice of science
2. What is a theory and what is a law of science?
3. Realism and anti-realism
4. Scientific explanation
5. What is falsifiability?
6. The limit of scientific reasoning
7. Science and pseudoscience
8. Positivism of A. Comte, H. Spenser (First Positivism)
9. The critical positivism of E. Mach and R. Avenarius
10. Karl Popper on scientific problems
11. Paul Feyerabend and his epistemological anarchism
12. Michael Polanyi and tacit knowledge
13. Correspondence theory of truth
14. Tarski's semanti c theory of truth
15. Coherence theories of truth
16. Pragmatic theories of truth
17. Deflationary theories of truth
18. Lynch's functionalist theory of truth
19. Is science important?
20. Contemporary science and ethical issues.
REFERENCE
Philosophy of Science Reading List (available online)
1. Chalmers, A. What is this thing called science? Hackett Publishing Company. Inc.
Indianapolis/Cambridge. Online. Available at:
http://www.filoczar.com.br/filosoficos/CHALMERS,%20Alan/CHALMERS,%20Alan.%20 What%20is%20This%20Thing%20Called%20Science%20(3.%20ed.).pdf.
2. Hitchcock, C. Introduction: What is the Philosophy of Science? Online. Available at: http://authors.library.caltech.edU/44793/1/hitchcock-2004.pdf
3. Ladyman, J. Understanding Philosophy of Science. London and New-York: Routledge, 2002.
Online. Available at:
http://www.bibotu.com/books/2013/History%20and%20Philosophy%20of%20Science/Lady man%20- %20Understanding%20Philosophy%20of%20Science%20(Routledge,%202002).pdf
4. Losee, J. A Historical Introduction to the Philosophy of Science. Oxford University Press. Fourth edition. 2001. Online. Available at: http://unhas.ac.id/rhiza/arsip/kuliah/Filsafat- Ilmu/LUIS%20ALFREDO%20PHILOSOPHY%20OF%20SCIENCE.pdf
5. Rosenberg, A. Philosophy of Science: a contemporary introduction. New-York and London: Routledge. 2005. Online. Available at: https://is.muni.cz/www/75243/041534316X.pdf
Key Texts/Primary Sources (available online)
| 1. | Bacon, F. The New Organon. Online. | Available | at: |
| https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/b/b acon/francis/organon/ | |||
| 2. | Descartes, R. Discourse on the Method of Rightly Conducting the Reason, and Seeking the | ||
| Truth in the Sciences. Online. https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/dZdescartes/rene/d44dm/ | Available | at: | |
| 3. | James, W. Pragmatism. Online. Available at: | http://www.philosophy- | |
| index.com/james/pragmatism/ | |||
| 4. | Kant, I. The Critique of Pure Reason. Online. Available | at: | |
| https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/k/kant/immanuel/k16p/ | |||
5. Kuhn, T. The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Available at: http://projektintegracija.pravo.hr/_download/repository/Kuhn_Structure_of_Scientific_Revol utions.pdf
6. Plato. Collected Works. Online. Available at: http://classics.mit.edu/Browse/browse-Plato.html
7. Popper, K. Objective Knowledge. A Realist View of Logic, Physics, and History. Online.
Available at: https://www.marxists.org/reference/subject/philosophy/works/at/popper.htm
8. Russell, B. On Denoting. Online. Available at: http://www.philosophy-index.com/russell/on- denoting/
9. Spinoza. The Ethics. Online. Available at:
https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/spinoza/benedict/ethics/
10. Wittgenstein, L. Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Online. Available at: http://www.philosophy-
index.com/wittgenstein/tractatus-logico-philosophicus/
Further Reading
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5.
Philosophy of science (http://philpapers.org/browse/general-philosophy-of science) at
PhilPapers
Philosophy of science (https://inpho.cogs.indiana.edu/taxonomy/2218) at the Indiana
Philosophy Ontology Project
Philosophy of science (http://www.iep.utm.edu/category/s-l-m/science/) entry in the Internet Encyclopedia of Philosophy
An introduction to the Philosophy of Science, aimed at beginners - Paul Newall. (http://www.galilean-library.org/manuscript.php?postid=43784)
Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science at the London School of Economics (http ://www2.lse.ac.uk/CPNS S/Home.aspx)